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Qilin (Agenda) Ransomware Explained: Real‑World Attack Timeline & 7 Fast Defenses
Stop Double‑Extortion Attacks Before They Start

TL;DR — Qilin (formerly Agenda) is a cross‑platform, double‑extortion ransomware written in Go and Rust.
1 — Why You Should Care
You’re sipping your morning coffee, casually scanning your dashboards. Then something strange catches your eye — unfamiliar file extensions, odd filenames. A few virtual machines suddenly go dark. Moments later, a message pops up in your inbox: a ransom note. No, this isn’t a Netflix plot. This is ransomware — and not just any strain. We’re talking about Qilin, also known as Agenda. In this blog, I’ll guide you through a detailed hypothetical attack scenario rooted in real-world tactics used by this ransomware group. We’ll explore how these attacks unfold, highlight common weaknesses that threat actors exploit, and provide clear actions you can take to strengthen your defenses. This isn’t fear-mongering. It’s preparation — the kind every organization should take seriously.
As of now, Qilin has publicly claimed responsibility for over 437 victims, and that number is still growing — according to ransomware.live.
🧬 What Is Qilin (aka Agenda) Ransomware?
Qilin, previously tracked as Agenda, is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that surfaced in mid-2022. It is written in both Go and Rust, and is capable of targeting both Windows and Linux systems — including VMware ESXi.
Victims are often hit with highly customized payloads — operators configure what files to skip, services to disable, and when encryption should trigger.
The group later rebranded from Agenda to Qilin, evolving its tooling, improving detection evasion, and expanding affiliate adoption.
Targeted Industries:
- Healthcare
- Education
- Manufacturing
- Legal and Professional Services
- Cloud and Hosting Providers
Double Extortion Tactics:
- Data Encryption – Files are encrypted using AES-256 and RSA-2048.
- Data Exfiltration – Stolen data is used for leverage via public leaks if ransom is not paid.
2.1 Evolution
- Agenda → initial branding
- Qilin → rebrand featuring stronger obfuscation, Chrome credential theft, and BYOVD drivers
2.2 How Double Extortion Works
- Encryption — Files are locked with AES‑256, keys protected by RSA‑2048.
- Data theft — Sensitive documents are exfiltrated during the breach.
- Leverage — Refuse to pay and the data is published on the leak portal.
🧨 How Qilin Executes Each Step – From Initial Access to Impact
Understanding Qilin’s attack chain isn’t just about listing tactics — it’s about knowing how and when they’re used in real intrusions. Below is a walkthrough of how each MITRE ATT&CK tactic might play out during a typical Qilin campaign, based on observed behavior.
🕵️ Abuse of Kickidler Monitoring Software
Qilin affiliates have been observed abusing Kickidler, a legitimate employee-monitoring software, to enhance their visibility post-compromise.
After gaining access (often via a trojanized RVTools installer hosted on rv-tool[.]net
), attackers deploy a PowerShell loader called SMOKEDHAM. This backdoor then installs Kickidler — allowing the attacker to:
- 🎥 Record user sessions in real-time
- ⌨️ Capture keystrokes and credentials
- 👀 Monitor administrator behavior
- 🧭 Track internal movements across the network
Originally built for workplace monitoring, Kickidler’s screen recording and session replay features are repurposed for credential theft, reconnaissance, and even backup system access.
📎 Source: BleepingComputer – Kickidler Abuse in Ransomware Attacks
🧰 Observed Tool Chain:
- Initial lure via fake Google Ads impersonating RVTools
- Trojanized installer from
rv-tool[.]net
- Loader: SMOKEDHAM PowerShell-based backdoor
- Post-access: Deployment of Kickidler monitoring agent
These tactics show how attackers increasingly rely on living-off-the-land and legitimate software abuse to bypass defenses and stay under the radar.
🛠 Initial Access
Techniques:
T1078
– Valid AccountsT1190
– Exploit Public-Facing Application
It starts quietly. A phishing email mimicking Dropbox or invoicing software arrives — or an IT staffer unknowingly installs a trojanized version of RVTools from rv-tool[.]net
. In other cases, attackers log in directly using purchased or reused RDP credentials.
Source: SentinelOne
🧬 Execution
Technique:
T1059
– Command and Scripting Interpreter
Once inside, Qilin drops custom payloads using native scripting tools. A PowerShell command silently downloads NETXLOADER
, which pulls in the ransomware binary — all without triggering traditional antivirus.
Source: Sophos
T1547.001 – Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
In at least one documented case, Qilin’s loader disguised itself as a Windows “SystemHealthMonitor” tool and used the Registry Run key to establish persistence:
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" `
-Name "SystemHealthMonitor" `
-Value "C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe //B //E:jscript C:\ProgramData\svchost.js" `
-PropertyType String -Force
This allowed the malicious script (svchost.js) to execute automatically on startup.
🔗 Source: Cyber Security News – Qilin Tops April 2025
🔓 Privilege Escalation
Technique:
T1548
– Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
They don’t wait for permission. Qilin brings their own vulnerable drivers (BYOVD) — like Zemana AntiMalware or Toshiba power drivers — to disable security tools and gain SYSTEM-level access.
🎭 Defense Evasion
Technique:
T1562
– Impair Defenses
Using renamed binaries like upd.exe
(a spoof of legitimate AV updaters), Qilin disables EDR, clears logs, and bypasses detection. The malware might even exploit outdated Carbon Black Cloud sensors to remain hidden.
🛂 Credential Access
Technique:
T1003
– OS Credential Dumping
Once elevated, Qilin dumps LSASS memory and extracts credentials from browsers like Chrome. These are used to access other systems silently.
Source: Sophos Report on Chrome Theft
🔄 Lateral Movement
Technique:
T1021
– Remote Services
With credentials in hand, Qilin moves laterally across the network using SMB, RDP, WinRM, and PsExec.
IT tools like ScreenConnect and AnyDesk are sometimes hijacked to extend access.
💥 Impact
Technique:
T1486
– Data Encrypted for Impact
When ready, Qilin triggers its payload. Files are encrypted with .qilin
or .qln
extensions.
Ransom notes like README.txt
or qilin_readme.txt
appear across file shares and desktop paths.
Backups, if reachable, are targeted and encrypted first.
ℹ️ If the technique IDs look cryptic, they’re part of the MITRE ATT&CK framework — a public catalog of adversary behavior used across cybersecurity.
🧠 Lessons Learned
Credential Hygiene
- Shared admin accounts still exist across machines
- No MFA on remote portals = recipe for breach
Network Design
- Flat networks = lateral movement playground
Backup Safety
- No isolation = encrypted backups
Comms Plan
- Teams default to Slack, WhatsApp — no fallback if infra is down
Decision Paralysis
- Who shuts down systems? Who notifies legal? No one’s sure
🧪 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Below are the observed IOCs associated with Qilin/Agenda ransomware from multiple trusted sources including SentinelOne, HHS, Sophos, Blackpoint Cyber, and Cyble.
📁 File Names
upd[.]exe
main[.]exe
web[.]dat
TPwSav[.]sys
avupdate[.]dll
qilin_readme[.]txt
README[.]txt
Source: SentinelOne, Blackpoint Cyber, Sophos
🔐 SHA-256 Hashes
aeddd8240c09777a84bb24b5be98e9f5465dc7638bec41fb67bbc209c3960ae1
3dfae7b75fbd029130ed4ea123d8bc37d5df0dbe456dbf403f755cb1ed5e6bc0
d3af11d6bb6382717bf7b6a3aceada24f42f49a9489811a66505e03dd76fd1af
011df46e94218cbb2f0b8da13ab3cec397246fdc63436e58b1bf597550a647f6
08224e4c619c7bbae1852d3a2d8dc1b7eb90d65bba9b73500ef7118af98e7e05
Source: SentinelOne, Rewterz, Blackpoint Cyber
🌐 Domains and IPs (Used for Payload Delivery or C2)
rv-tool[.]net
– Fake RVTools site used to deliver loader (from Cyble, SentinelOne)- IPs related to payload hosting and exfiltration were not published directly, but traffic was observed connecting to unknown external hosts via PowerShell (
Invoke-WebRequest
) in sandbox testing by Cyble.
Source: Cyble, SentinelOne
🔗 Leak Site (Tor)
hxxp://qilinxxc4zxthxse46tmrjppn6s2p7vnmw4nclsbxugrgfcgqz2wx4id[.]onion/
Source: ransomware.live, Blackpoint Cyber
These IOCs should be monitored across:
- EDR/XDR alerts
- DNS resolution logs
- Email gateways
- Proxy and firewall connections
- Process creation and PowerShell logs (Event IDs 4104, 4688)
⚠️ Note: Always verify IOCs with internal telemetry to avoid false positives. Use them in conjunction with behavioral detections for maximum effectiveness.
🧼 Cyber Hygiene Tips That Actually Work
- Use MFA on everything you can — especially remote access
- Limit admin rights and clean up stale accounts
- Patch internet-facing systems quickly
- Segment critical assets from everyday users
- Store at least one backup copy offline — and test recovery
- Set up alerts for service creation, file rename bursts, and odd login patterns
- Define offline comms and response plans in advance
✅ What Helped Most
- Quick isolation of infected hosts, even manually, slowed spread
- Visibility from tools like Defender, CrowdStrike, and Splunk helped trace lateral movement
- Out-of-band comms (Signal, SMS, even Zoom) helped keep coordination alive
- Having a printed or static IR checklist meant fewer delays
🎯 Final Thoughts
You don’t need perfect. You need ready.
Qilin isn’t unique in how it attacks — but in how well it exposes your gaps. The lesson?
You don’t rise to the level of your plan. You fall to the level of your training.
Run a tabletop. Review your backups. Update your response tree.
You’ve got time now. Use it.
Stay safe. Stay ready.
📚 Further Reading & Sources
- Ransomware.live – Qilin victim list (live count)
- SentinelOne – Agenda/Qilin Deep Dive
- U.S. HHS HC3 – Qilin Threat Profile (PDF)
- Sophos X-Ops – Chrome credential-stealing tactic
- Blackpoint Cyber – Qilin Ransomware Threat Profile (PDF)
- SOCRadar – Dark-web profile & leak-site URL
- GitHub – Ransomware Tool Matrix
- Cyble – Ransomware Attacks April 2025: Qilin Emerges from Chaos
- BleepingComputer – Kickidler software abused in ransomware attacks
- Rewterz – Lazarus Qilin samples and hashes
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